If accused is unable to pay adequate compensation to victim or his/her heir, then court ought to have awarded compensation U/S 357 A Cr.P.C. against State from funds available under victim compensation scheme.
2015 All MR ( cri ) 1662 Supreme Court
The State of Himachal Pradesh
V/s
Ram Pal.
Top Senior Counsel for Maharashtra Govermment HARISH SALVE asked SC for tIme to show the Supreme Court that 'DANCE BAR IS AN ANIMAL IN ITSELF', even as Maharashtra government has been in defiance of the Supreme Court’s order that had directed it to begin accepting bar licence applications.
Salve asked a bench of justices Dipak Misra and PC Pant, for additional time to produce materials highlighting the harmful sociological effects of dance bars, and submitted that the Maharashtra government will, in the interim, comply with the court’s 12 October order that had stayed its prohibitive law on dance bars. The bench said: “We must remind the authority that the Supreme Court order has to be respected!!
Landmark Judgments on SERFAESI Act, 2002
1. Mardia Chemicals v/s UOI
2. Union Bank of India v/s Satyavati Tondan
3. Kanaiyala Sachdev v/s State of Maharashtra
4. Kaushal Shah v/s State of Maharashtra
The Supreme Court has ruled that a compact disc (CD) is a document under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court also held that a CD has to be exhibited/played by the trial court to enable the public prosecutor to admit or deny its genuineness under Section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
The decision was rendered by a Division Bench of PC Pant and Dipak Misra JJ. in an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
The appellant accused is on trial for molestation of his niece and is currently lodged in jail. He had sought to rely on the recording of a conversation between his wife and son, and the father of the victim. The appellant had moved an application Section 294 of CrPC to get the CD played in the court for preserving a copy of the text contained, and therein for further communication to the Forensic Laboratory for establishing its authenticity. The application had, however been rejected by the trial judge. The High Court had affirmed the order passed by a Special Judge.
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Special judge was correct in denying the application to play the CD so that its genuineness could be considered and established. Relying on the various decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court interpreted Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act to hold that a CD is a “document”.
“In R.M. Malkani vs. State of Maharashtra, this Court has observed that tape recorded conversation is admissible provided first the conversation is relevant to the matters in issue; secondly, there is identification of the voice; and, thirdly, the accuracy of the tape recorded conversation is proved by eliminating the possibility of erasing the tape record.
In Ziyauddin Barhanuddin Bukhari vs. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra and others, it was held by this Court that tape-records of speeches were “documents”, as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act, which stood on no different footing than photographs…
In view of the definition of ‘document’ in Evidence Act, and the law laid down by this Court, as discussed above, we hold that the compact disc is also a document.”
The Court then proceeded to hold that since CD is a document under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, it is not necessary for the court to obtain admission or denial on a document under sub-section (1) to Section 294 CrPC personally from the accused or complainant or the witness. It held that the endorsement of admission or denial made by the counsel for defence, on the document filed by the prosecution or on the application/report with which same is filed, is sufficient compliance of Section 294 CrPC. The court also turned down the contention of the respondent that the petition has been filed to prolong the trial.
“In our opinion, the courts below have erred in law in rejecting the application to play the compact disc in question to enable the public prosecutor to admit or deny, and to get it sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, by the defence. The appellant is in jail and there appears to be no intention on his part to unnecessarily linger the trial, particularly when the prosecution witnesses have been examined.
Therefore, without expressing any opinion as to the final merits of the case, this appeal is allowed, and the orders passed by the courts below are set aside.”
Suit for specific performance _ Period of one year was agreed for executing the sale deed _ Though it was necessary for the defendant to obtain permission from the competent authority but the intention of parties to make time the essence of the agreement is evident _ Agreement further stipulates that if permission is not obtained within period of one year, then the sale deed would be executed within a period of one month from obtaining such permission _ Subsequent stipulation in the agreement does not prescribe the outer limit for obtaining such permission _ Permission was required to be obtained within reasonable time which can be taken to be three years _ Even assumed that after reasonable period of three years from 21-4-1989 which is 21-4-1992 there was refusal on the part of the defendant, in terms of Article 54 of Limitation Act the suit could have been filed within three years, that is till 20-4-1995 _ Suit was filed on 13-6-2001 after almost six years _ Suit as filed was barred by limitation under Article 54 of Limitation Act. (See 2015 (6) LJSOFT 170)
Suit for specific performance _ There is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract _ Though no time is fixed for performance of contract but it does not mean that the agreement stipulated indefinite period for performance of contract _ Contract to be performed within reasonable time but the question "what is a reasonable time", is, in each particular case, a question of fact. (See 2015 (3) LJSOFT 136)
Suit for specific performance of contract _ Though time is not the essence of contract in respect of sale of immovable property but in so far as urban properties are concerned, the contract should be concluded within a reasonable time. (See 2011 (11) LJSOFT 135)
Suit for specific performance of contract _ Appellant did not move the court in reasonable time _ Vendor had already died _ When the suit was filed there were minor children _ Property was ancestral property and the appellant/ plaintiff ought to have shown that there was legal necessity for sale of the property _ Since no question of limitation was raised by the Court below it is not possible to enter into that question in Second Appeal _ However it would not be equitable to allow the specific performance _ Specific performance need not be granted merely it is lawful to do so _ Appeal allowed to the extent of refund of money and as a consequential relief the respondents would be entitled to get back possession of the house property. (See 2009 (12) LJSOFT 207)
Suit for specific performance of Agreement of Sale _ No time specified for performance of promise but the contract must be performed within a reasonable time _ What is the reasonable time is to be seen in Article 54 of Limitation Act _ For specific performance of contract three years time is prescribed under the said Article and, therefore, reasonable time means three years _ Trial Court rightly held that the suit was time barred as the same was not filed within reasonable time. (See 2008 (10) LJSOFT 76)
Suit for specific performance of agreement of sale _ No date for performance fixed in the agreement _ Suit could be held to be barred by limitation only on a finding that plaintiffs had notice of refusal of performance by the defendants and that the plaintiffs approached the court beyond three years of the date of notice _ Question of limitation could be dealt with only after evidence is taken and not as a preliminary issue. (See 2006 (4) LJSOFT (SC) 24)
Magistrate has no power to take cognizance of the offence under Prevention of Corruption act. Magistrate can't pass an order u/s. 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. in respect of offence which Special Judge alone is competent to try.
2015 All MR ( cri ) 1080.
Shri Nilesh S. Rane
V/s
Mr. Ravikanth Yadav and Others.
Dashrath Rathod’s Judgment have no effect in view of the Amendment;
A Two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Justices J.S.Khehar and R.Banumati has held that, in view of the Amended Section 142(2) of Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance 2015, the place where a cheque is delivered for collection i.e., the branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, where the drawee maintains an account, would be the determinative of the place of territorial jurisdiction for filing Complaint under the NI Act. The Bench was hearing an Appeal from an order dated 5.5. 2011 of Madhya Pradesh High Court in which it is held that the Jurisdiction to file a Complaint under NI Act lay only before the Court where-in the original drawee bank was located. The High Court relied on the Three Judge Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra. Allowing the Appeal Justice Khehar held as follows; “Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, a reference may be made to Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, whereby Section 142A was inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act. A perusal of Sub-section (1) thereof leaves no room for any doubt, that insofar as the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned, on the issue of jurisdiction, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, would have to give way to the provisions of the instant enactment on account of the non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of Section 142A. Likewise, any judgment, decree, order or direction issued by a Court would have no effect insofar as the territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned. In the above view of the matter, we are satisfied, that the judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case would also not non-suit the appellant for the relief claimed.” “A perusal of the amended Section 142(2 leaves no room for any doubt, especially in view of the explanation thereunder, that with reference to an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the place where a cheque is delivered for collection i.e. the branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, where the drawee maintains an account, would be determinative of the place of territorial jurisdiction”. The Bench said. It is also held that “Section 142(2)(a), amended through the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, inter alia in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, where the cheque is delivered for collection (through an account of the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account). We are also satisfied, based on Section 142A(1) to the effect, that the judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case, would not stand in the way of the appellant, insofar as the territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings emerging from the dishonor of the cheque in the present case arises.” “The words “…as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times…” used with reference to Section 142(2), in Section 142A(1) gives retrospectivity to the provision”.
Bridgestone India Pvt. Ltd Vs Inderpal Singh.
