First Information Report and Its Evidentiary Value

First Information Report and Its Evidentiary Value
First Information Report Commonly known as F.I.R is first and foremost important step to set the criminal law in motion. Though the term F.I.R is nowhere mentioned in the code of criminal procedure but information given under Section 154 of Cr.pc is popularly known as F.I.R.          .    Provision of section 154 makes possible that any person aware of the commission of any cognizable offence may give information to the police and may, thereby set the criminal law in motion. Such information is to be given to the officer –in –charge of the police station having jurisdiction to investigate the offence. The information so received shall be recorded in such form and manner as under provided in Section 154.This section is intended to ensure the making of an accurate record of the information given to the police.

An analysis of S.154 brings out the following points:

(1)The information is to be given to an officer in charge of a police station having jurisdiction for investigating the case [S.154 (1)].
(2)If the information is given orally to such officer, it shall be reduced to writing by the officer himself or under his direction [s.154 (1)].
(3)The information .if given in writing, or if reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the Informant [S.154 (1)].
(4)The information as taken down in writing shall be read over to the Informant [S.154 (1)]].
(5)The substance of the information is then to be entered by the Police officer in a book kept by him in the prescribed form [S.154 (1)].

This book is called Station Diary or General Diary (S.44 of the Police Act.1861).
(6)The informant then shall forthwith be given a copy of the information as recorded in the aforesaid manner [S.154 (2)].

Refusal on part of police to register F.I.R.

The principal object of the first information report from the point of view of the Informant is to set the criminal law in motion. And the police cannot refuse to register the complaint nor this power be usurped by the magistrate. This object will be defeated if the police officer in charge of the police station refuses to record the information as required by the above stated  provision of S.154(1).

Here S.154(3) comes into picture which provides that if any person is aggrieved by a refusal on the part of the police officer in charge of a police station to record the information ,he may send by post the substance of such information in writing to the Superintendent of police(S.P) concerned. If the Superintendent is satisfied that the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, he shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a subordinate police officer in the manner provided by the code. Sub section (3) of S.154 further provides that such subordinate police officer investigating the offence shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of police station in relation to that offence.

Important case laws:

It is pertinent to note that information to have the status of first information report under S.154 must be information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and it must not be vague but definite enough to enable the police to start investigation.

            In State of Haryana v/s Bhajan Lal[,AIR 1992 SC 604] it was held that the condition which is sine qua non for recording a FIR is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence .If any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer- in –charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of section 154(1),the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form that is to say ,to register a case on the basis of such information.

In the case of State of U.P v/s R.K.Srivastava [(1989)4 SCC 59] the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that ‘if the allegations made in the FIR are taken at  their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute an offence ;the criminal proceeding instituted on the basis of such FIR should be quashed.

Where an anonymous telephonic message did not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, it was held that such a telephonic message could not be held as FIR [Tapinder Singh v/s State (1970)2 SCC 113].

However it has been observed by the Rajasthan High Court in case of Tohal Singh v/s State of Rajasthan,[1989 Cri LJ 1350(Raj HC )]that ,’if the telephonic message has been given to officer in charge of a police station ,the person giving the message is an ascertained one or is capable of being ascertained the information has been reduced into writing as required under S.154 of Cr.Pc and it is faithful record of such information and the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and is not cryptic one or incomplete in essential details, it would constitute FIR.

                It is important to note that information in respect of cognizable offence must be recorded before the commencement of investigation, but not otherwise. It was held in case ofLachhman v/s State [1973 CriLJ 1658(HP HC)] that if oral information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is given to the police officer in charge of a police station, but the same is not recorded and the police officer proceeds to the scene of the offences and there records statement of witnesses, none of such statements would amount to FIR because in such a case the real FIR was unrecorded oral information given to the police by the informant.

However in a case wherein though the police officer went to the scene hearing rumours but recorded a statement at the police station ,it was held that in circumstances of the case that statement could be accepted as FIR.[Pattad Amarappa v/s State of Karnataka, AIR 1989 SC 2004]

A statement recorded by the police in respect of a cognizable offence can be considered and used as FIR, if the same is recorded before the commencement of the investigation, but not otherwise. Simply because the statement was the first one recorded by the police in point of time, would not make it FIR if such a statement was recorded after the commencement of the investigation as held in case of S.V.Nadar v/s State of Mysore[(1980)  1 SCC 479]

                   The relative importance of FIR is far greater than that of any other statement recorded by the police during the course of the investigation. Therefore the question, whether a statement is FIR or is one made after the FIR assumes importance. Considering this aspect the Crpc contains adequate safeguards to ensure its accuracy. Thus S.154 requires the FIR to be recorded verbatim in the very language of the informant (as far as possible), to be read over and explained to him, and to be signed by the informant. The section also makes it obligatory that a copy of the FIR is given to the informant. Section 157 of Crpc further requires the investigating officer to send the FIR at once to the magistrate taking cognizance on police report .Hence ,though subsequent interpolations in the FIR are not unknown, nevertheless the aforesaid provisions to a large extent ensure the accuracy of the FIR.    

Evidentiary Value

The evidentiary value of FIR is far greater than that of any other statement recorded by the police during the course of investigation. It is settled principle of law that a FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence, that is to say, it is not evidence of the facts which it mentions. However, its importance as conveying the earliest information regarding the occurrence cannot be doubted.

Though the FIR is not substantive evidence, it can be used to corroborate the informant under S.157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, or to contradict him under S.145 of the said Act, if the Informant is called as a witness at the time of trial as held in case of Hasib v/s State of Bihar [(1972)4SCC 773] It may however, become relevant under S.8 of the Evidence Act.

Married daughters born before 2005 have equal rights on ancestral property

Married daughters born before 2005 have equal rights on ancestral property - Bombay High Court: In a landmark judgment, a full bench comprising of  Mohit Shah CJ, MS Sanklecha and MS Sonak, JJ. held that the daughters alive on September 9, 2005 would be entitled to equal rights in ancestral property. Earlier, a division bench in the case of Vaishali S. Ganorkar vs. Satish Keshavrao Ganorkar 2012 (5) Bom CR 210 had upheld the prospective operation of the  Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which in effect disentitled all daughters born before 9 September 2005 to claim their equal interest in the Joint HUF. A single bench comprising of RG Ketkar, J. disagreed with the decision of the Ganorkar case and concluded that the amended Section 6 had retrospective effect from the date of the enactment of the Principal Act and is applicable to all daughters who are born before or after 2005 as a daughter becomes a coparcener in her own right by  her birth itself.  When the matter was referred to this Court, the Court agreed with the decision of Justice Ketkar.

The Court clarified that in case the coparcener had died before 2005, then the pre-amended law was applicable but by passing of the Amendment Act, 2005 all daughters who are alive ipso facto become coparceners, thus settling the interpretation of the amended Section 6. The Court observed that the only requirement was that when an Act was being sought to be applied, the person concerned must be alive as the Legislature had specifically used the word ‘on and from the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.  This was done so as to ensure that rights which are already settled are not disturbed by virtue of person claiming as an heir to a daughter who had passed away before the Amendment Act came into force.

The Court also denied the reference of the Sheeladevi judgment, clarifying that  principle laid down  in  Sheeladevi vs. Lalchand  (2006) 8 SCC 581 that the Amendment Act of 2005 is prospective and would have no application where succession opened prior to the Amendment Act of 2005 coming into force, does not militate against the view taken by them. The Amendment Act of 2005 applies to a daughter of coparcener who is born before 9 September 2005 and alive on 9 September 2005, on which date the Amendment Act of 2005 came into force, and obviously there is no dispute about the entitlement of daughter born on or after 9th September 2005. [Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari vs. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari, Second Appeal No. 566 of 2011, decided on August 14, 2014]